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This paper is dedicated to the characteristics of phenomenon of state identity in the
modern Russian society which has been affected for last 20 years by the processes of
virtualization, informatization and political transformation. Today, the Russian Federation,
like any other state in the world, is closely connected to non-local events and ideas; the
“title nation” and “strong state” ideas are routinely confronted by challenges from multiple
agents including immigrants, the mass media and especially the Internet. In the present
study, empirical ﬁndings from several studies developed with methods of visual sociology,
expert interviews and public opinion research are used to understand how people in
Russia tend to realize their desire to be the unit of the state forming so-called “invisible”
state identity, which is not absolutely loyal to the government institutions and is very
stable. This type of identity has been formed under alternative institutional logic which
isn’t preordained by acting of the state but is shaped as well by cultural, social, and
cognitive processes in “real”, but especially in “virtual” spaces of communication. And
despite “Russia as a state” is still a way of maintaining the symbolic power of political
leaders, there are some strong but hidden tendencies forming “Russia as a community of
citizens” under the inﬂuence of information technologies, global values, norms and
outlooks.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Russia as a newly formed state with a contradictory and
diverse past has been meeting serious problems of state,
national and civil integrity forming since the collapse of thet. Petersburg, Russia.
arch Center, Hanyang
-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,HanyUSSR. Meanwhile, the necessity of overwhelming of
economical and political crises which the country has been
suffering during the last twenty years of new country’s life,
led to the low level of power structures’ attention to the
problem of state identity.
P. Kolste investigated symbolic expression of priorities
and strategies of “national formation” in the countries
which came to existence or gained independence recently;
he researched state symbols of Russia and afﬁrms that
there hasn’t been any “uniﬁed, well known national
symbols” even 10 years after the dissolution of the USSR
(Kolste, 2000, 246). The State Duma ofﬁcially passed the
federal constitutional law about national emblem, ﬂag and
hymn of the Russian Federation and this fact itself can be
perceived as a signiﬁcant political event which legalizes
a certain set of state values and state identity.angUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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livening up during the last 3–5 years. It is caused both by
the forthcoming elections of 2012 and by the entry of
Russia into the so-called “reﬂexive period” (Beck, Giddens
& Lash, 1994) of development related in a certain manner
to the inﬂuence of globalization. The state is concerned
about social peace, tolerance, loyalty to the government
institutions and formulation of interaction frames between
different social groups inside the country and abroad.
Nevertheless, the investigation of self-identiﬁcation of the
Russian citizens in the aspects of territory and nationality is
quite necessary; the modern society needs to ﬁnd the
answer to an important question: what is “Russia as
a state”? Is it a unity of citizens or a way to maintain the
symbolic power of the Russian leaders?2. State, national and civil identity: the problem of
concept explication
2.1. Forming of terminological continuum
A researcher of state identity usually comes across an
obstacle in constructing a system of notions to use in
discussion. The Russian science inherited the Soviet
terminology which was created with the purpose of an
ideological substantiation of the national policy. The Soviet
discourse was strongly determined by the ideas of patri-
otism, amor patriae, responsibility to the state and its
leaders. ‘Patriotism” became a key concept of political
socialization and state identity; it functioned as a discourse
mechanism which could have regularly reproduced the
necessary type of political loyalty. The main task of patri-
otism reproduction was to unite individuals around the
state; the “globalists” and “cosmopolitans” were blamed in
neglect of the national culture.
The Russian Science of 1990-ies discovered the foreign
sources: using western conceptions, orientation to the
works of some European and American, researchersTable 1
The terminological continuum of state identity.
Subject Process T
People(s)
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State people
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Political nation
Civil nation
Civil society
Community
Ethnocultural people
National ethos
Political community
Political socialization
Political culture
Political participation
Political consciousness
Political values
Civic participation
Civic culture
Civil consciousness
Civic values
Civil socialization
Ethnic consciousness
Ethnic culture
Patriotic upbringing
Patriotic values
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(
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Rbecame a trend and a certain quality mark of an investi-
gation regardless of the research object. New terms
appeared in the area of identity studies, e.g. “corporate
consciousness”, “cosmopolitan identity”, etc. New notion
interpretations described another type of social reality and
had their own semantic and connotative nuances, which
were losing a part of their precise meaning due to the
translation and using the foreign notions to describe
Russian contemporary reality. This “westernism” was crit-
icized by some researchers who turned to the “eternal
Russian” topic of search of a “special Russian way” and
“National Idea”; they recreated an old pre-revolutionary
interpretation of the state identity where “Russian con-
ciliarism” and “Orthodoxy” took an important place (see
Andreeva, 2003; Sagatovskiy, 1999; Shevchenko, 1992).
As a result of this conceptual mixture the notion of
identity is now described by the huge amount of terms and
expressions, which certainly have the same meaning: self-
determination of individuals and social groups within the
Russian state. The terminological continuum consists of the
following: the subject’s of identiﬁcation characteristics;
processes which lead to changes in a subject; tools to
achieve the result; the result of identity forming, including
its sense and properties. We have analyzed more than 100
monographs and scientiﬁc papers in Russian edited during
the last 15 years, and we marked out the most common
notions (Table 1).
These terms usually are copied from paper to paper and
are used on default as synonymic or ampliative forms. The
shades of meaning can be understood intuitively, but the
difference isn’t verbalized normally.2.2. Competition between the terms
Despite the existence of a wide synonymic row, the
main two notionswhich are commonly used to speak about
“the state construction” correspond with the international
practice. Those two notions are “national/ethnic identity”ools Result
ational idea
ational values
ational character
ational soul
ational consciousness
self-consciousness)
ivil patriotism
oul of people
oul of nation
eadiness to participate
National identity
National-and-state identity
National-and-ethnic identity
Ethnic identity
Civil identity
State-and-civil identity
General civil identity
Political identity
National homogeneity
Civil solidarity
All-Russian identity
Identity of place
Local identity
Regional identity
Territorial identity
Patriotic identity
Civilization identity
National-and-state consolidation
Corporative national state
Fellow citizenship
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form the phenomena of citizenship. However, in the ﬁrst
case the citizenship is considered as “given from the birth”;
in the second case the citizenship is an acquired quality of
an individual, it is his or her voluntary choice. That is to say,
the understanding of initial presuppositions of identity is
based on the apprehension of citizenship as an inborn or
acquired status. The researches underline that it’s impor-
tant to deﬁne which approach (ethic or civil) lies at the root
of the national policy and discourse of “state construction”
(Panov, 2010). Apparently, the government of a multina-
tional country can’t rely on ethnic base of identity; it could
possibly be based on the state symbols – constitution, ﬂag,
hymn, oath of allegiance, etc. This is relevant for the ofﬁcial
strategy of state identity forming in Russia.
Meanwhile, these notions have their own contradictory
history; when transferred into the Russian context, they
have come in collision with current scientiﬁc and general
associations; actually, these terms are mere trendy deﬁni-
tions. Thus, the translation of the notion “civil society” into
Russian is quite formal, because it doesn’t have historical
roots in Russia; an attempt of search of functional coinci-
dence of civil society in Russia isn’t a productive way of
creating a classiﬁcation, because there are no structures of
the “western” type of civil society in Russia (Volkov, 2003).
Moreover, today the difference between the notions
“civil identity” and “national identity” diminishes even in
the international science, particularly when the “national
identity” is considered as a “community” or “fellow citi-
zenship”, organized on the state-political principle (E.
Gellner, B. Anderson etc.); this particular constructive
approach gets more popular during the last 40–50 years.
Although the notion “national identity” ﬁts quite well to
the society of modern era, nowadays it sounds less
adequate, because state as a nation disappears in the world
of globalization and IT penetration (Joseph, 2004), it
becomes an inaccessible ideal.
The constant changing of the national boards after two
world wars, dissolution of the USSR and the Eastern Block
in 1989–1991, recognition of subnational units in Western
Europe in 1990-ies led to comprehension that the national
identity is “unconditional”; then some researches came to
a conclusion that the national identity is a thing that can be
created and revised by an individual during his or her life.
In this circumstances the notion of national identity is
diluted and it can change the meaning (adding some ethnic
or political connotations) depending on the context; and
the process of identiﬁcation is accompanied with total
uncertainty of a person, trying to set the limits of his “self”
and the limits of “another”, deﬁne his needs, interests and
expectations. Among other things, the science reﬂection of
these processes led to an activation of using the notion
“civil identity”, which is supposed to mean, that a citizen-
ship is an acquired quality of an individual, his or her
personal choice.
Nevertheless, this term can be also put in doubt: it
seems inadequate when describing the basics of identity in
the modern world. Civil identity presupposes that people
have a need to establish and activate connections to other
people. Given thesis usually is told as a matter of course,
however, it’s quite ambiguous. Thus, Z. Bauman deﬁnes themodern society as “individualized”: the relations between
people are being broken, people are more concentrated on
themselves, indifference to the others, tendency to estab-
lish brief and superﬁcial interpersonal relationships, short
duration of any alliance, episodic and fugacity of social
interactions.
This happens due to the disappointment of a modern
individual in the possibility to achieve his goals by team-
work. Bauman notices that people usually perceive team-
work “at the best case as something useless, and in the
worse case as something harmful from the point of view of
well-being and happiness of an individual” (Bauman, 2005,
73); this leads to the loss of social and political character-
istics which could potentially form a citizen. This is a reason
to come to a conclusion about inconsistency of the notion
“civil identity”.
Therefore, both “national identity” and “civil identity”
represent some convenient concepts to attribute the
processes of the modern world. In the society of post-
modern the state-nation disappears and people tend to
autonomy and anonymity (Luckmann, 1979), his main
feature is individualism. Do people have any need in self-
identiﬁcation with a social unity, particularly with a state
as a political social unity? I suppose, they do. The state
identity is a form of comprehension of social unity with the
others; it has some clear characteristics of limits and clear
difference between “they” and “we”; on the other hand it
gives an individual quite a wide freedom, including the
freedom of individualism without denying the other
identities.
“State identity” is so-called two-dimension concept. On
the one hand, a state performs the basic social function and
creates conditions for the social development, that’s why it
needs to pursue the “nationalizing state policy” focused on
strengthening of the cultural homogeneity (Brubaker,
1993). In general, creating and support of the basic
elements of identiﬁcation of “integral whole” is a way and
a condition of territorial and institutional survival of a state.
The idea that national identity can be constructed and
disseminated is based on the premise that the so-called
“popular nationalism” is always a result of national
doctrine created by elite.
On the other hand, the search of individual and group
identity including the socio-cultural civic, and political
identity affects society in whole, though it doesn’t play the
role of an individual’s basic need. In this case the state isn’t
a signiﬁcant object of self-reference. People always and
everywhere need the mechanisms regulating their rela-
tionships, a tool for harmonizing of diverse interests,
a certain balance of powers. The state is a logical precon-
dition for the identiﬁcation chain “dwelling–settlement–
region–country”" which gives to individuals the ability to
identify them with the social whole. This possibility may
remain potential and not implemented in the “society of
individuals”, but its’ very presence is obligatory for
successful socialization. Moreover, in the world of open
territorial and information borders often the state becomes
so-called “home for an individual” which allows an indi-
vidual “to be himself” no matter the variability of self-
identiﬁcations. Thus, “state identity” is awareness of
belonging of an individual or a social group to a state, which
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wider than territory, citizenship and nationality.
3. “Visible” and “invisible” state identity
3.1. The ofﬁcial discourse of national identity and problems of
its perception
The state identity has a deﬁnite verbal and visual image,
which become apparent in the ofﬁcial statements of the
state and party leaders, statutory wording (especially in the
Constitution), photographs and videos of military parades,
activities of youth movements. The “visible” state identity
is mostly created by political and social elite. In effect, this
“visible” image legitimizes the world-view which favors to
maintenance and development of state institutions. In
most cases the state leaders promote an idea that the state
must be the state of the nation and must serve its interests.
Purposeful national identity forming doesn’t mean that the
state “imposes” its will on the people. This is a common
process for a modern society, which proceeds from the
natural variability of the state, society and individual. A
good example of the national identity forming is Singapore,
where national identity is perceived as a political and social
problem, linked with the construction of a community of
people united by the territory (Hill & Lian, 1995; Kong &
Yeoh, 1997; Ortmann, 2009).
In Russia we can see some relevant elements of the
national identity explicitly expressed in the ofﬁcial
discourse; these are loyalty to the government, patriotism,
national idea, political and social activity, territorial,
linguistic and national historical continuity, ethnic and
religious tolerance, the relationship between the power
and society (“feedback”), national symbols (when they are
known, accepted, proud of, respected and properly used).
The detailed analysis of these elements was carried out
by a political scientist P. Panov in his article “Nation-
building in post-Soviet Russia: What kind of nationalism is
produced by the Kremlin?” (Panov, 2010). He goes through
the expression of the “Russian nation” idea in the ofﬁcial
Kremlin discourse and concludes that “cultural” and
“multiethnic” angle of the state forming produces openness
and inclusivity, which are so necessary in the modern
society. Meanwhile, this idea limits the development of
civil society based on the recognition of people’s rights and
responsibilities, rather than emphasizing the "unique
historical path”, and the “Russian mission”.
Sociological studies conﬁrm the conclusions of Panov.
Russian society doesn’t demonstrate the full acceptance of
the concept formulated by the elite. Neither the citizen nor
the goals nor the motives of a responsible creative activity
can be artiﬁcially constructed: this is the common point of
view. The formation of national identity necessarily implies
a strong feedback mechanism, which Russia lacks.
Thus, the Soviet model of patriotism is being repro-
duced in the modern educational discourse; the principles
of political ideology reproduction of 1930-ies still has not
changed signiﬁcantly (Voronkov & Karpenko, 2007).
Nowadays, the concepts of “homeland,” “fatherland,”
“patriotism” predominate in the ofﬁcial public self-
presentation; the same ideas can be found in someeducational programs. “Soviet-style civil identity” keeps
being conserved in the form of the ideological proclama-
tions of patriotism. Meanwhile, the real social meaning of
these concepts has signiﬁcantly changed.
3.2. The conﬂict of identities
The collapse of the Soviet Union affected one way or
another the life of every citizen, but it mostly inﬂuenced to
the Russians. This was due to an important feature of
Russian identity: many researchersmentioned that citizens
of Russiawere passing directly from the level of USSR to the
local level of their settlement in the process of identifying
themselves with the notion of “homeland”; they were
omitting the republican level. This situation was occa-
sioned by the special position of the Russian Soviet Feder-
ative Socialist Republic (the RSFSR) in the political system
of the USSR. Unlike the other republics, the RSFSR had been
deprived of many attributes of state; and its citizens
preferred to identify themselves directly with the Soviet
Union. After the collapse of the USSR the concept of
“homeland” was narrowed in the public conscience to the
notion of the “small motherland”: oblast, city, an autono-
mous republic as a part of the Russian Federation; and it led
to a crisis of self-identiﬁcation.
Another consequence of these processes came out quite
soon: an unexpected rise of ethnic self-consciousness of the
Russian people; despite the “multicultural” nature of ofﬁ-
cial discourse, in the behavior of Russians appeared some
features which had not been common for them before.
Thus, during the Soviet era Russians almost didn’t make
account of their ethnic identity. However, after the collapse
of the USSR, a lot of Russians became a “national minority”
in the former Soviet republics; and they were compelled to
the creation of an objective basis for Russian nationalism as
a social and political movement.
It is quite important that in the semantic ﬁeld of modern
Russian identity the nation has been interpreted not only as
something separate from the state, but also as something
opposed to it (see Panarin, 1994; Vdovin, 1996). Thus, in
1999 most Russian citizens being abroad would prefer to
identify themselves by belonging to an ethnic community
(the Russians), rather than by their citizenship. Only 36% of
respondents were ready to identify themselves as citizens
of Russia while traveling in Kiev (or any other city of the
former USSR); and 47% would call themselves “the
Russians”. This reaction is very uncharacteristic for multi-
national states with liberal culture, and it is very similar to
the reactions of groups consolidated on the ethno-national
basis (Gorshkov & Tihonova, 2000).
The identiﬁcation conﬂict has appeared after the
collapse of the USSR: “Russian (which belongs to the
Russian Federation) versus Russian (which belongs to the
ethnic community of Russians)”. The notions are different
In Russian language: “the Russian as a citizen” is called
“rossiyanin” unlike “russkiy” which means “the Russian by
the ethnic origin”.
Another identiﬁcation conﬂict is “Russian (which
belongs to the Russian Federation) versus Soviet”. One can
distinguish two aspects in the latter. Firstly, with the course
of time the Soviet Union begins to occupy a niche of the
A. Sanina / Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 126–146130“stable past” in the social memory of the Russians. Thus,
according to a nationwide survey conducted in 2011, more
than a half of Russian citizens (55%) believe that both
international and domestic situations were the most stable
and secure in the Soviet times (1960–1980) (Survey Release
#1788, 2011).
Secondly, for some generations of the Russians “the
Soviet” has already become a symbol, a fashionable brand.
The main socialization stage of the generations, who were
born in the middle eighties and later, happened already in
the post-Soviet era; and therefore, their socialization, was
associatedwith the extended contents of socializing agents.
It is a well known fact that so-called «Dot.com-generation»
(born since the middle of 1980s) forms the reference-group
of “signiﬁcant others” basing on the virtual principles; and
this reference-group does not always include members of
previous generations, who have got the “personal knowl-
edge” of the past. Nowadays, 37% of the Russians admire
Stalin, have a liking for him or respect him, 28% of citizens
appreciate his personal qualities, and one in ﬁve (21%)
believes in the wisdom of the leader of the peoples, noting
that he led our country to power and prosperity (Survey
Release #1522, 2011).
Speaking of the characteristics of Russian identity it is
interesting to demonstrate the distribution of self-
identiﬁcation of the Russians in the 2005–2010 (Table 2).
In this issue “territorial and ethnic identiﬁcation” (all-
Russian (a), Soviet (b), European (c), worldwide (d), regional
(e), national (f)) is combined with religious, professional,
family-role and the universal self-identiﬁcation (“person”).
The decrease of value of traditional referents gets signiﬁcant
in modern Russia. Old referents give way to the new
(“private space”, “communicative interaction”, “mass
media”); and the state is unable to control their type and
level of effects.
3.3. Political activity and relations with the authorities
It’s quite signiﬁcant that people express no wish for
participation in political life. In 2010, a survey revealed onlyTable 2
Distribution of answers to the question “How would you answer the
question “Who am I?”” (ﬁxed-choice question, three answers as
a maximum).
Descriptor 2005 2006 2008 2010
A Citizen of Russia 60 59 70 58
B Soviet 14 13 13 15
C European 2 2 1 2
D Citizen of the World 4 3 4 6
E Resident of the region, town,
village (Siberian, Muscovite,
Novgorodian, etc.)
19 16 23 19
F Nationality (Russian,
Ukrainian, etc.)
16 16 19 18
G Religious conviction (Orthodox,
Muslim, etc.)
4 3 4 5
H Job (teacher, employer, etc.) 6 4 7 7
I Family-role (father, wife,
grandmother, etc.)
7 8 13 17
J Simply “person” 29 24 26 30
K Other 1 1 1 1
L No answer 1 1 1 1
Source: Survey Release #1522, 2011.19% of Russians who expressed an intention to be more
engaged in politics (Levada Centre Survey Release, 2011).
People explain their reluctance telling that their involve-
ment in the political process cannot change anything (34%);
they are sure that politics should be better dealt by profes-
sionals, rather than by ordinary citizens (24%). Politics and
political control are more and more often interpreted by
society as “vocation and profession” (in the Weberian
sense), people don’t want to see politics as a part of
everyday/“civil” practice. Lack of time to be engaged in
politics is the third reason explaining why the Russians
aren’t ready to be more involved in politics (23%); it corre-
sponds with the changing of priorities of identity (Table 2).
Most of the Russians (62%) prefer to live, relying only
on themselves andavoiding contact with the state
authorities: the indicator of “individualization” has grown
by 5% in comparison with 1999. At the same time, only 3%
of Russian citizens believe that they can satisfy their
needs with the help of the state. 77% of people are sure
that the state gives them so little that they owe nothing to
him; on the contrary, they feel themselves free to ask for
more (in 1989, in full swing of perestroika, it was 44%. At
that moment 37% of the RSFSR population declared that
they were ready to reduce their acquirements regarding
the difﬁcult situation of the state, and to make certain
sacriﬁces for the sake of it). When the political activity of
people is so low, the situation leads to an intensiﬁcation
of individualization factor in the process of state
identiﬁcation.
3.4. Accepting of state symbols
It is well known that the power and political relations
especially at large social groups need a symbolic basis.
Political symbols can serve as self-representation of ideo-
logical and axiological orientations of political leaders.
These symbolic forms can be presented by historical terms,
ceremonies, insignia and other formalities. These signs can
be either inherited or invented, but most importantly, they
must be available and to the majority and understood as an
ofﬁcial symbol.
The main characteristic of the symbolic basis of “new
Russia” is succession. It is interpreted as a continuation not
only of the Soviet period of Russian history, but also the
period of the Russian Empire (before the Revolution of
1917). This position is clearly stated in the explanatory note
to the description of the state emblem of Russia: “The
modern state emblem of Russia is a new emblem, but its
components are deeply traditional, and it reﬂects the
different stages of national history, and continues on the
threshold of the third millennium ... The reinstatement of
the double-headed eagle as the state emblem of Russia
embodies the continuity and succession of national
history” (National Symbols of Russia, 2008). The basic
symbols of Russia carry a load of imperial authoritarianism,
based on the exploitation of patriotic components, military
heroism and glorious past of Russia. The state emblem of
the Russian Federation repeats the main features of the
emblem of the Russian Empire, the national anthem
repeats the melody of the Soviet anthem, and the national
ﬂag (white–blue–red tricolor) was historically established
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legitimated once more in August of 1991. This type of
symbols – “future in the past” was not immediately
accepted by the Russians, but at the moment, these char-
acters are recognizable and accepted as the state symbols
by the majority of citizens.
Public holidays are an important component of the
“invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm & Terence, 1983)
which is important for the construction of state identity.
The system of holidays in Russia looks quite contradictory.
The representatives of the new Russian authorities at ﬁrst
followed mostly the same pattern as the Bolsheviks in 1917
solving problems of the historical succession. The Bolshe-
viks renounced the “old world” which meant to reject
everything that had been before the October Revolution of
1917. “The New Russia” in 1991 refused to have anything to
do with the Soviet past; Soviet holidays were abolished,
Soviet state symbols, rewards, monuments to the Soviet era
statesmen, and other paraphernalia, which reminded of the
Soviet times, vanished.
The October Revolution Day transformed into the Day of
Consent and Reconciliation, and the May 1 which had been
called the “International Workers’ Day” – was celebrated as
“The Day of Spring and Labour”. Another step in this
direction was the return of the ofﬁcial status to the
Orthodox Christmas and Easter holidays. The leaders of the
state replaced the former holidays, but they haven’t
supplied the people with appropriate simple legend. As
a result, nowadays 77% of Russians do not know why the
main national holiday “The Day of Russia” is celebrated on
June 12 exactly. 49% do not know the name of the holiday,
confusing it with the “Constitution Day”, “City Day”, “The
Day of Unity” and with the old name of the holiday – the
“Independence Day of Russia” (Survey Release #1244,
2009). There no doubts only about one holiday which
was from Soviet times – Victory Day (May 9). In this case
the symbolic burden of this both personal and state holiday
is accepted by the extraordinary majority.
3.5. The patriotism as the basis of national identity
Thus, the creation andmaintenance of the identiﬁcation
of individuals and social groups with the state involves the
movement of concepts of identity “top–down”, while the
statesmen often suggest that they are the objects of patri-
otic loyalty personally, because it was they who formulated
a genuine “collective will” of the nation (Brown, 2004, 53).
However, this is only one aspect of national identity. The
success of its implementation depends on the depth and
completeness of acceptance of those concepts, myths,
metaphors, which are formed at the level of the leaders of
the state. Promotion of citizenship and patriotism is an
essential attribute of any modern state which provides the
very “political support” of the system so convincingly dis-
cussed by Almond and Verba (1963, 11).
However, it’s interesting to know how the “ofﬁcial”
patriotism corresponds to the ﬂexible and ever-changing
identity of “here and now”, which is common for
a person of postmodern society (Baudrillard, 1983) where
the self-organization rather than controllability is an
essential feature of the process of national identityformation. The society needs people capable to produce
some acceptable rules of relationships, realizing the need
for integration and harmony, which is based on the balance
of interaction between state and society rather than on the
priority of values and interests of the state power.
Public Opinion Research Centers regularly conduct
surveys to measure the relations of different social groups
and state. The results they get are quite stable: in the past
six years (2005–2010) 84–88% of Russians consider them-
selves patriots of their country (Survey Release #1522,
2011). These data may illustrate the success of govern-
ment strategy of national identity building, and this success
often receives special mention at some conferences and
seminars. However, these surveys aren’t designed to char-
acterize what peoplemean telling “I am a patriot”; what are
the cognitive, symbolic and emotional characteristics of
patriotism in Russia. “The human layer” of national identity
remains invisible behind the quantitative data and, there-
fore, it requires looking for some new methods of socio-
logical research.
4. The “invisible” state identity as an object of study
The state identity which is constructed “from the
bottom upwards” is evidently ﬁxed in the format of virtual
reality; this happens because this ambience corresponds to
the sharpest requirements of autonomy and anonymity of
an individual and allows a person to manipulate his/her
own identities almost indeﬁnitely (Burke, 2006; Stryker,
2007; Wise, 2008). The term “virtualization” needs to be
understood correctly: these are the processes that create
a kind of “another” reality: imaginative, ideal and fantastic.
Virtual reality can substitute the daily lives and change the
impact of material values in society. According to Banks,
Emmison and Smith, “we live in the community of massive
ﬁgurativeness” (Emmison & Smith, 2002), and new “visible
cultural forms” (Banks, 2001) could appear without any
special creative project. Thus, an image appears as a form of
mnemonic system of a social group or community and
designs some ready-made blocks for storage of information
which could sometimes substitute the reality (Grigorjeva,
2000).
Having laid down an aim to ﬁnd and describe the visual
codes by which the symbolic elements convey the concept
of “state identity” as an object of analysis, I chose Live-
Journal community «Potsreotizm» (http://potsreotizm.
livejournal.com). The community was found June 22,
2006 by the user mcparker (http://mcparker.livejournal.
com). This community gets high place –381 of 1,055,232
communities in the Yandex (the biggest Russian Internet
search engine) rating and has 3743 users registered in
LiveJournal, and has 113,000 page views per month (the
information is veriﬁed on July 11, 2011).
4.1. What is “potsreotizm”?
The word ‘potsreotizm” is a contextual synonym of so-
called “jingoism” (or “ﬂag-waving”), which was inter-
preted as a special phenomenon in the middle of the XIX
century. The term “ﬂag-waving” (literally Russian expres-
sion is “kvass patriotism”, derived from the title of famous
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literary and philosophical discourse by prince Peter Vya-
zemsky. He identiﬁed by this cliche the peoplewho showed
off their special “Russianness” and put on “traditionally
Russian” clothes (Vyazemskiy, 1827). The clothes were so
strange, that people sometimes were mistaken for the
Persians.
The “Jingoistic patriotism” – is a wrong love to the
motherland, when people praise their “own” just because it
is their own and reject all the “strange” things just because
they are “foreign”. The deﬁnition of “kvass patriotism” is
due to the fact that by the middle of XIX century the
western-oriented intellectuals and aristocrats considered
kvass (the ancient Russian drink widespread in Russia of
that times) as a drink that symbolizes the country’s back-
wardness in comparison with Europe. This position
dissatisﬁed Slavophile circles, and kvass got even more
popular. This symbolic battle between Slavophiles and
Westerners led to putting into practice and spreading of the
term “kvass patriotism”. Kvass became a “patriotic” drink
which embodied “original”, “truthful” Slavdom and “love to
the motherland”.
So, the “Potsreotizm” is an absurd form of patriotism.
The term is used in the community in the very sense.
“Potsreotizm” is a virtual community of people whose aim
is a critical representation of material and symbolic objects,
situations and actions that in their point of view violate
moral and political principles of citizens, as well as rational
or sensual love of country, pride of achievements and
culture of their country, the desire to identify themselves
with it, the desire to protect its interests.4.2. Research methodology
The content of the journal consists of images (photos,
drawings, collages), videos, texts. Only images have been
chosen for the analysis, because the visually expressed
non-verbal communication has its own expressive means;
when it is placed to a speciﬁc socio-cultural context it
allows us to “hear” the text as speech. The interpretation is
a key research procedure here, because a “visual text” not
only appeals to the conscious perception, but also implicitly
attracts the potential of image culture (Grigorjeva, 2008).
The study covers 5 years of the community life (June
2006–June 2011) and it is based on the scenario method of
sociological analysis (shooting scripts method (Suchar,
1997, 37)). It is designed to form a visual content using
some questions specifying the problem. The study of visual
content allows drawing conclusions about the state of
object. We formulated the questions taken as a basis for the
analysis of visual content in the following way:
1. What are the tools forming the “invisible” state identity
in the contemporary Russian society?
2. Who is an object of attention of the community (and
therefore, who is a subject of “potsreotizm”)?
3. What are the main objects of interest that form the
content of “potsreotizm”?
4. What typical images of objects and situations are esti-
mated by community members as negatively patriotic?What do they mean by “invisible” state identity in
Russia?
The study was conducted in three stages. The ﬁrst stage
consisted in looking through all of 2574 images placed in
the community (some images were published two or more
times, the repeated ones weren’t taken in account). In the
second stage the criteria of theoretical sampling were
formulated: 1) the image must correspond with one or
more questions lying at the root of the analysis; 2) the
images must be interpreted as “potsreotic” image by the
members of the community (there should be no comments
such as “and where is potsreotizm?”); 3) there must be
“live images” (no Photoshop or other correcting programs
are allowed). Thus, basing on these criteria, 1260 images
were chosen to include directly in the procedure of anal-
ysis. In the third stage a type of “image-answers” for every
question were selected. Then, a procedure of open coding
for each image was conducted including writing descrip-
tions and designating of a short name (“shortcut”); this
shortcut expressed one or another position of analysis and
classiﬁed image elements according to their cognitive and
emotional burden.
These images were represented in one of the following
three variants:
1. objective images (images of objects or animals);
2. subjective images (images of people);
3. action images (images of the subject–subject or the
subject–object interaction);
4. emblematic images: visual self-representation of public
ﬁgures, institutions or organizations.
The comments of community members which formed
a discussion on some relevant topics were used to clarify
the connotations inherent in an image or in a purpose of its
appearing on this site.4.3. The tools of “invisible” state identity forming
T. Veatch noted that the emotional evaluation of
phenomena is a fundamental force which maintains the
structure of society and ensure the general conformity and
mutual consent (Veatch, 2002). We construct our views on
the world and what it should be like, through emotional
evaluation together with the other people. The main task of
the “Potsreotizm” community is “undermining” of
common ideas, beliefs, rules of behavior associated with
authority or institutional state relations. That’s why
community members are using irony and humor.
Irony is a statement or an image where the meaning
contradicts to the givenwords or picture; Irony is a contrast
between the told/shown and the implied. Irony is always
a conﬂict, it’s a break of reality into several simultaneous
worlds running counter to each other.
According to the echoic mention theory of irony (D.
Sperber and D. Wilson), the irony rhetoric must be exam-
ined in relations along with the basic psychological and
interpretative mechanism, which remains invariable,
despite the cultural differences. The irony is regarded as
Fig. 1. The irony, based on creolized text. The left side: the inscription on the car glass is “The Russian Federation. Anti-corruption committee”. The right side: an
old shabby house is obviously situated in the poor backwoods of Russia. The inscription on the poster is “We continue Putin’s course! Russia, Forward!”.
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something that has been already said by someone earlier
(hence there is a metaphor of an echo) and at the same time
he expresses his attitude to what was said. Irony is a way to
dissociate from the mentioned point of view in order to
ridicule it, to show its weakness (Wilson and Sperber,
2007).
Humor is an “emotional absurdity” (Veatch, 2002) and it
signiﬁes that 1) the subject interprets the situation as
a violation of the “subjective moral principle” – a vision of
what the situation should be; 2) at the same time a situa-
tion is interpreted as something common. The essence of
humor is revealing the contradictions, exposing the
absurdity of the situation. Humor shows the ambivalence of
any occurrence. The political humor plays a special role:
when a person feels dissatisﬁed by the sphere of his life
relating to interactions with the state or authorities, humor
can relieve stress and let people feel superior to the “elite”.
As George Orwell mentioned, “Every joke is a tiny revolu-
tion” (Orwell, 1945).
The basic communicative qualities of humor deter-
mining its ability to maintain group solidarity are its
resistance to an external stress and control of the members
of the community. Humor is similarly used by the mass
media exercising the “comic control” at the macro level; in
this case, however, they criticize the “elite” as it is, rather
than some highest representatives of the political elite;Fig. 2. The “silent” irony. Left: Students’ dorm, some students are watching a TV
television a speech of the President of Russia.consequently, the genre of satire gets ideologically neutral.
This form of derision creates the illusion that the bureau-
cratic structures consider the criticism and, therefore, they
seem “developing”, ready to take in account an individual
opinion; this is a way to maintain the integrity of society.
Irony and humor form a powerful mechanism for social
cohesion. Their use assumes that people have some shared
experience and, ultimately, they are ready to identify
themselves with a group, society and state. Different
people, different cultures have different principles; it leaves
a mark on the humor perception. Z. Freud, in his “The Joke
and Its Relation to The Unconscious” observes: “If the same
joke causes laugh in a few people, it is a proof of a great
mental coordination” (Freud, 2007). Veatch asserts that
people has to get the same “subjective moral principles” for
the same perception of something ridiculous; and these
principles deﬁne the attitude to the object: people can have
different reasons to laugh. A feminist would hardly laugh at
the jokes about dumb blondes; an Afro-American would
hardly laugh at the racist jokes. Naturally, if a person laughs
at something, it does not contradict his deep moral
convictions (Veatch, 2002). Groups of people laughing at
speciﬁc jokes tend to appear again and again, developing
social relationships in the context of political information.
V. Belinsky believed that the rising of satirical genres
was due to the formation of social identity as “a result of
mature civil consciousness” (Rumina, 2003, 62). He wasperformance of the future President of Russia. Right: a villager is watching
Fig. 3. Left: Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev with a corncob on in the United States. Right: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with the newest model of
iPhone in the United States.
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nature becomes apparent ﬁrst of all in the fact, that it works
more in the real world than in “Wonderland”. It can be the
part of the state mechanism; it can even be a tool of
repression, but it is much more often a result of activity of
civil society or its prototypes” (Razuvaev, 2002). Moreover,
in the modern world irony is seen as a mediator of
cosmopolitan values adoption.
Thus, Turner relates irony to dissociation of an indi-
vidual from his homeland and adoption of a certain way of
life, when people are geared up for a critical thinking and
skepticism about the national values: “the principal
component of cosmopolitan virtue is irony, because the
understanding of other cultures is assisted by an intellec-
tual distance from one’s own national or local culture.Fig. 4. Left: The boy is being pushed aside the guards, when he is trying to shake Puskepticism and distance from one’s own tradition are the
basis of an obligation of care and stewardship for other
cultures. (Turner, 2002, 57)”.
There are two sorts of visual irony in the “potsreotizm”
community. The ﬁrst type is based on creolized text; it is an
image with some words incorporated into the picture. The
necessary conﬂict or the break of reality is based on the
game of words and their visual environment.
The meaning and the picture are two types of reality
possible and conﬂicting at the same time. The ironic
contrast is related to the level of ideological perception; it
refers to theworld-view, system of conventional norms and
standards of conduct. The examples of this type of irony are
shown on the Fig. 1. We can see the inscription on the glass
of an expensive car on the left: “The Russian Federation.tin by the hand. Right: The U.S. President Barack Obama is talking to the kids.
Fig. 5. A popular Russian singer F. Kirkorov is wearing a T-shirt with the
image of Vladimir Putin at the “Eurovision” (2010).
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Russia, Forward!” is written on a poster on a shabby house
which is situated in the poor backwoods of Russia (the right
side). Two incompatible ways of life are always combined
in the ironic creolized texts; it forces a viewer to put the
dominant view of the world to the question. Reconsidera-
tion of the evident through the broadening of outlook is an
important component of irony. “Anti-corruption” Russia
which is capable of going “forward”, simply does not exist
in the context of the depicted reality, and therefore in the
consciousness of perceiving subjects.
The second type of irony is “silent irony”: the effect of
conﬂict of realities is exclusively based on the images,Fig. 6. Left: A policeman is directing a gun to a kitten. Right: The sign is inscripted: “
who protect you!”without using a text. The “ﬁrst” world-view is formed here
only on the basis of values and convictions shared by the
community members. An element of discrepancy may be
obvious, hidden or absent in the visual outline.
It is obvious that the representation of those images
where the elements of discrepancy are absent and clear for
anyone, are the most powerful markers of social perception
of a situation. Thus, we can see the situation of viewing the
performance of the future (in 2007) and the present (in
2011) President (Fig. 2). Neither the left nor the right ﬁgures
don’t have obvious markers of discrepancy. However, the
situation is perceived by community members as “pots-
reotic”; its interpretation is related to living conditions of
people (an old bed and clothes, beer, lopsided window,
small room) and to the irrationally serious attitude to the
authorities (most of the Russians are sure that they cannot
affect the process of governing the state).
The main difﬁculty of the “silent” irony lies in the need
of showing the picture of the world and its immediate
destruction. This mechanism consists of transformation of
expectations, revision of regulatory system, and reaction
(talk, laughter, criticism, ...). In the case of visual irony, we
are dealing more with individual and group consciousness
rather than with the picture. The audience has no possi-
bility to know for sure whether the shown subjects are
concerned about the ironic contrast between their world
and the reality that is promised them “by the TV”. At the
same time, community members discussing the picture
understand the disparity of the situation – as well as the
idea that the author had in mind making the post and
showing the image.
The Bakhtin’s metaphor of carnival illustrates the close
relationship of irony and the state identity forming
processes: “In fact, carnival does not acknowledge any
distinction between actors and spectators. Carnival is not
a spectacle seen by the people, they live in it, and everyone
participates because its very idea embraces all the people.
While carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it.
Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it,
and everyone participates because its very idea embraces
all the people. While carnival lasts, there is no other life
outside it. During carnival time life is subject only to its
laws, that is, the laws of its own freedom” (Bakhtin, 1990).Internal Affairs Department of Taimyr Autonomous Okrug. Don’t blame those
Fig. 7. Left: Easter. A car with loudspeakers and a poster with an inscription “Christ is risen indeed!” is moving along the street. Right: a queue for holy water is
standing near the church.
Fig. 8. Left and right: “occasional” Nazi greetings.
Fig. 9. The “Russian style”: iPhone and “Hammer” limousine.
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The range of objects of regard of the community
“Potsreotizm” (or the subjects of the “potsreotizm”) is
rather wide; it consists of various elements. Nevertheless, it
is possible to ﬁnd some active (performing the action) and
some passive (those who are impacted by these actions)
objects among them. The active objects are divided into
individual objects “I am” (speciﬁc, identiﬁable person),
individual objects “we are” (image of “ordinary” citizen),
and group objects (an individual or several individuals as
representatives of particular social group).
The leaders of individual group are expectedly the
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the PrimeFig. 10. Above: the inscription is “The service of one window”; there is a closed
“Elections-2011”.Minister Vladimir Putin. As a rule, their image is based
on the “silent” type of irony, which enhances very much
the signiﬁcance of representation. The representation
context is mainly everyday and ordinary; thus, we can
see Dmitry Medvedev in subway/sitting at the micro-
scope during a visit to a Research Studies Institute/
looking through the grenade launcher gun sight during
a visit to a military base/painting a toy in a children’s
center; we can see Vladimir Putin at a young hockey
players training/riding a ﬁtness equipment/singing
a song by the campﬁre with builders of Olympic facilities
in Sochi. The ironic effect of any situation with the state
leaders is based on a comparison of the “common” and
the “special”, it can be expressed in a famous Russianwindow nearby. Below: four portraits of the same candidate on the stand
Fig. 11. Vladimir Putin (left) and Dmitry Medvedev (right) in the situation of “everyday” interaction.
Fig. 12. Left: Dmitry Medvedev, his wife, and Vladimir Putin are in the church. Right: the patriarch Cyril and Vladimir Putin.
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the leaders into “informal” context is perceived as
a “demotion” to the level of “common people”, and
therefore it causes irony.
In addition, the situation of comparison of Russian
leaders with the President of the Soviet Union or the heads
of modern states is also quite common. For example, weFig. 13. Left: a policewoman and a clergyman are in a romantic atmosphere ofnote that the posture Dmitry Medvedev resembles the
posture of Nikita Khrushchev (Fig. 3); it was noticed by the
community members and represented in the context of
fanatic cultivation of the guarding. Fig. 4 compares the
situation of interaction of Vladimir Putin and Obama with
children, and raises the question of possible carelessness of
the Prime Minister Guard service.a blooming garden. Right: The religious right of christening in the army.
Fig. 14. Left: a priest, and the boxer N. Valuev. Right: A portrait of the Patriarch in a football stadium in a row of different ﬂags: there are the ﬂag of the football
club “Dynamo”, the national ﬂag of the Russian Federation and the ﬂag of Moscow.
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is on the third place in the frequency of self-
representation in the community. Some Russian politi-
cians and ofﬁcials are found quite frequently (at least once
per half a year); these are the head of the Chechen
Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Deputy Chairman of the State
Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the president of Belarus,
Alexander Lukashenko, Moscow Mayor (until September
2010) S. Luzhkov, the ﬁrst Russian president Boris Yeltsin,Fig. 15. Top left: women at the beach in bikini decorated with the Russian nationa
entrance to the church. Top right: a sleeping girl surrounded by portraits of Put
monument to the Soviet partisans.St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matvienko (until
September 2011). The images of representatives of
“cultural elite” and popular culture are less common: ﬁlm
director N. Mikhalkov, dancer A. Volochkova, singer F.
Kirkorov (Fig. 5). A signiﬁcant part of the individual group
consists of the “ordinary people”, individual “we”: men,
women and children in everyday situations; the visual
proﬁle of these situations is relevant for subject area of the
community.l ﬂag and an icon of the Virgin. Bottom left: a woman in a short skirt at the
in and icons. Bottom right: a ﬂirty girl is being photographed beside the
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associations of people on professional, ethnic or social
base: military, police, sportsmen, ofﬁcials, State Duma
deputies, representatives of the former Soviet republics,
members of youth movements (“Nashi” (“Ours”), “Molo-
daya Gvardija” (“Young Guard”)), various patriotic associ-
ations, as well as children. Particular attention is paid to the
police (see Fig. 6), the military and to the clergy.
The look at the ﬁrst two groups is so close, because
people understand the importance of maintaining the
social order; they know that the violation of the order is
directly related to the failure of the security forces in ful-
ﬁlling their duty. However, the communitymembers shows
their interest in the church life and clergymen because of
the rise of the ofﬁcial “orthodox” church discourse and
participation of the Orthodox Church in political life.
Despite the fact that, according to some Russian surveys,
during the last 5 years there have appeared many people
approving the teaching of religion basics at school (53% in
2009 versus 47% in 2001 (Survey Release #1318, 2009)),
their number is still not much above 50%, and discussions
about the increasing social and political inﬂuence of theFig. 16. A young man is photographed at a VicOrthodox Church in Russia arise regularly (Orthodox
Church policy., 2007).
The religiosity of the Russians (both ordinary people and
political leaders) raise doubts among the community
members. A fast growth in the number of religious people
after more than 70 years of living in an atheistic country is
easy to explain in the context of the search of identity. On
the other hand, the fast return to the church raises ques-
tions about the depth of religious feeling; this part of life is
usually very private, normally, people don’t put their
private life in the window. Therefore, any ostentation and
massive participation associated with religiosity become
the target of irony of the community members (Fig. 7).
Passive objects of attention are the symbolic, material
and symbolic, material and institutional elements. The ﬁrst
group is “symbolic elements”; these are thewords “Russia”,
“Russian” and a demonstration “Russianness”/or belonging
to the Russian Federation; emblem, anthem, ﬂag of the
Russian Federation, special signs having patriotic meaning
in the ofﬁcial discourse (signs associated with the II World
of 1941–1945); imperial and Soviet symbols (including
Lenin, Stalin), attributes of public holidays, teaching oftory Day parade with portraits of Stalin.
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sionally” placed to the context of everyday life, deserve
special attention and are being ﬁxed in the community by
its members (Fig. 8).
The “material and symbolic elements” are roads, car
plant VAZ, Skolkovo and vodka as a “Russian national
drink”. The “material elements” are possessions of the
authorities (houses, villas, yachts), as well as clothes and
decoration designing items in the “Russian” or “Russian
Federation” style (Fig. 9).
The “Institutional elements” are state structures, polit-
ical and social organizations and institutions (army, church,
political parties (“Edinaja Rossija” (the "United Russia")) is
among the leaders, it is followed by the communists (with
a signiﬁcant lag in the frequency of mentions in the
community), elections etc.). The representation of social
institutes is an important indicator of interpretation of the
current situation by the communitymembers. For example,
Fig. 10 illustrates the perception of the state support for
small-scale enterprises, and the attitude to the “democratic
elections” in Russia; this is a visual explanation of the
processes, which are the reason of receiving a title of “Not
Free” country from “Freedom House” (an American non-
governmental organization); this organization has beenFig. 17. Cakes with images of the Russian national ﬂag. Top left: the party “Edinaja
ruble. Day of Russia”.identifying Russia in its annual report “Freedom in the
World” as a “Not Free” country since 2004 (Freedom in the
World, 2011).
4.5. The contents of “potsreotizm”
The simplest reason for the attention of the community
members is an interaction of different categories of “pots-
reotizm” subjects. Thus, the photographs showing the
President and Prime Minister (so-called “tandem”) are
likely to appear in the community; the more ordinary and
everyday is the situation of interaction, the greater is the
level of irony and mockery of the community members
looking at the picture (Fig. 11).
An attitude of the community members to any confu-
sion of the “religious” and the “secular”: the representa-
tives of the state authority and the clergy evoke irony (see
Fig. 12): a clergyman and a soldier, a policeman (Fig. 13) or
an athlete (Fig. 14).
A special category of photographs shows behavior of
people emphasizing their nationality, religion, or using the
state symbols (including images of political leaders) in an
inappropriate way, style, form, situation (from the point of
view of the community members), (Figs. 15–17). The mostRossija” (the “United Russia”). Top right: “Happy Police Day!”. Below: “One
Fig. 18. Top left: a bow to the images of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev (Youth Educational Forum “Seliger”, organized by the youth movement “Nashi”
(“Ours”) under the guidance of the Presidential Administration). Top right: an elderly woman is kissing the Yuri Luzhkov’s hand (Luzhkov was a mayor of Moscow
in 1992–2010). Below: The students bow to veterans.
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Russian!” on the t-shirts, notepads, doors, cars, etc. (and it’s
important that the national self-marker (“Russian”) domi-
nates over the ethnic – “belonging to the Russian Federa-
tion”). This category also includes images of leaders of theFig. 19. Left: The poster “To live in Evenkiya is a great piece of luck: it falls only to 0
municipal district of Evenkiya”. Right: The inscription on a construction fence “LetUSSR on the Russian dolls, alcohol cocktail “Patriot”, cofﬁn
“Patriot”, ice cream and cake in the colors of the Russian
ﬂag, the inscription «Made in Russia» on the boots,
a portrait of Vladimir Putin painted on the wall in a chil-
dren’s gym for judo, exclusive pens with portraits of.01 of 142 million of Russians” with a caption “Petr Suvorov. The head of the
us make Ivanovo the capital of Ivanovo region!”
Fig. 20. The “potsreotic” use of St. George’s Ribbons.
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cow City Hall or St. George at the cost of 15,000 rubles
(approximately 350 V), datebooks titled “Putemedvitel”
and “Ezhemedvednik” (funny titles containing some parts
of the leaders’ family names), an announcement of “Putin
Party” in a Moscow club, a stampwith an image of Vladimir
Putin’s baby photo, etc.
The representation of the patriotic feelings driven to
extremity (pride, gratitude and love for the state and its
leaders), (see Fig.18), as well as the “regional pride” (Fig.19)
are quite important too.
However, the most negative reaction appears when
the symbols of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945Fig. 21. Left: the Victory Day celebration. A veteran has fallen down, but young p
forgotten” in a dustbin.(the II World War) and the symbols of its celebration are
used in an inappropriate way; the Victory Day holiday
has an unequal importance and a great individual and
symbolic signiﬁcance to the Russian Federation and its
citizens. We can see the image of Ribbon of Saint George
(Fig. 20) which have been used since 2005 on the
Victory Day ceremonies (St. George’s Ribbon is a replica
of the traditional St. George’s ribbons, black and orange
colors that have become a symbol of military valor and
glory of Russia; during 6 years of the campaign over 50
million ribbons were spread all over the world (The
history of St. George’s Ribbon.)). Fig. 21 represent
disrespect to a veteran who is a member ofeople don’t care. Right: A sign inscription: “No one is forgotten, nothing is
Fig. 22. Left: a textbook with the title: “We are the patriots!”. Right: A fragment of a page of German language textbook; a translation exercise: “While Putin
holds power, everything will be ﬁne”.
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the memory of the Victory.
Finally, the most important content of “potsreotizm” as
well as the ofﬁcial patriotic discourse is patriotic education.
It is based on the old ideological principles, and its current
status in Russia is characterized by numerous “excesses”
represented in the community. Thus, the community
members attribute some “potsreotic” features to the books
such as “Russian language”, “Russian logic for school” or
“Russian probabilistic logic”. Fig. 22 shows some fragments
of these textbooks.
Patriotism and patriotic education as a basis of the
ofﬁcial system of state identity forming are the subject of
attention of society which notices when they fall short of
accepted standards.
4.6. The “potsreotizm” as a national identity basis
One of the main objectives of our analysis is to identify
common objects and situations, valued by the community
members as negatively patriotic; thus, they describe the
“invisible” state identity in contemporary Russia.Fig. 23. A lamp “United Russia – the Party of Crooks and Thieves” (tWhile the national identity is being constructed, history
(including the history recorded in photographs) is no
longer just a collection of facts; it transforms to a narrative
where the image is not valuable as itself, but only in the
socio-cultural context where it is placed by observers. The
ﬁgure of an observer comes forward. We deliberately did
not analyze the geographic and age–sex classiﬁcation of the
“Potsreotizm” community; it is well known that an identity
in the virtual world is quite relative and impossible to
determine for sure; it can’t be tested anyhow. The impor-
tant thing for us is that the community is formed by the
people interested in the Russian state; even when they
criticize and make fun of it they accept it and identify
themselves with the state.
The community members as Internet users are inﬂu-
enced by some global values; and it shapes their outlook
which is a base to build the ironic effect of the represented
images. The general ideas of the community indicate that
we are dealing with a particular social community of
people for whom national identity does not mean unlim-
ited loyalty and patriotism as it is required by the ofﬁcial
discourse of “nation building”.he articles of the Constitution are engraved on the lamp leg).
Fig. 24. Left: The inscription on the gate, standing in an empty ﬁeld: “Russia”. Right: The inscription on the stone in the forest, “Glory to Russia!”
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though not always verbalized concepts that can be roughly
summarized in the following way.
- Public state personalities should be engaged only in the
circle of their duty: a) they attract attention because
they are always in the public eye; b) their “statehood”
means by default that there is a large amount of
administrative problems and, therefore, the statesmen
are more occupied; c) the excess of information about
a government ofﬁcial reduces the real efﬁciency of
governance.
- The spiritual life has to be separated from the secular;
and the church shouldn’t be under the political control.
Religion is associated with an outlook, with search for
the “personal identity”; politics and governance are
associated with activities and professionalism. The
demonstration of “unity” is always no more than
a demonstration which leads to the formation of arti-
ﬁcial religion and artiﬁcial statehood.
- The state symbols (including images of political
leaders) shouldn’t be used in “private everyday”
contexts.
- Patriotism, including the process of patriotic educa-
tion, must not be enthusiastic and performative: the
“sense of state” is private and it isn’t intended to be
shown off.
Certainly, any verbalization of the visual is a rough
generalization. The “Potsreotizm” community is just one
example of a “virtual localization” of processes of national
identity constructing taking place in the Russian society.
Nevertheless, the analysis of visual content of this
community allows us to show the discrepancy between the
ofﬁcial discourse and its interpretation by some social
groups. This discrepancy refers to a lot of points, but the
main could be the following:
- The gap between the declared modernization and
democratization, and the inability of authorities to
implement them;
- The gap between the vertical and horizontal control
systems;
- The gap between authorities and population, a lack of
places for their interaction;- The gap between religiosity and spirituality;
- The regional gaps;
- The gap between the rapidly growing segment of
society that has an Internet access and has mastered
the culture of networking, and the consumers of tele-
vision products which are mostly entertaining.
It’s hard to tell where will this processes lead us; but it is
clear that the development trend is the increase of distance
between society and state; the state is losing the ﬁght for the
citizen, whose values are formed in an era of globalization,
territorial openness and accessibility of information.
A typical example of the processes of “bottom” symbolic
restructuring of the ofﬁcial ideology is the situation with
the Russian “majority party” – “Edinaja Rossija” (the
“United Russia”); it has 75% in the current State Duma, 75 of
the 83 heads of federation subjects are the members of the
party. The famous LiveJournal blogger navalny (http://
navalny.livejournal.com) added to the party title a meta-
phorical “postﬁx”: “The “United Russia”, the Party of Crooks
and Thieves”. Less than in a month this expression was
spread in the Russian Internet space so much, that even six
months later it comes in the second rowof a Google request
beginning with the word “united”. Moreover, the phrase
has passed ofﬂine and has begun to be spread in the
material format (Fig. 23).
It is common for a modern individual to have some
speciﬁc strategies of ﬁnding identity; we suppose that the
main of them are consumption and adaptation
(conformism). Under the inﬂuence of global values the
need of self-identiﬁcation with the state is being trans-
formed, but it doesn’t disappear entirely (Fig. 24). The
power structures may have to review the strategy of
national identity forming to maintain the desired behavior;
the state will have to take into account the needs of socially
active groups.
5. Conclusions
20 years have passed after the collapse of the USSR, but
Russia has not formed the concept of national identity
which would take into account the state interests and
needs of individuals and social groups being formed under
a new outlook and a new system of values. The “visible”
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discourse is represented in some state situations; it
competes with the “invisible” identity which is reproduced
in the “depth” of society and it is shown in the mechanisms
of visual irony and humor. The “ﬁrst” picture of the world
(the basis of irony) is formed outside the state borders, as
a true reﬂection of voluntary or involuntary cosmopolitan
character of a modern individual.
The need for national identity as belonging to an
“integral whole” determines the social interest to the
current situation in the state. In this context, we can argue
with the assertion of Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer, 1946) that
people are not able to ﬁnd themythological character of the
politics. Myths and concepts created by the political elite
today are being constantly interpreted with the help of
irony, and people more and more often treat critically the
myths and concepts at the level of social daily routine.
Nowadays, “Russia as a state”" is still a way of main-
taining the symbolic power of political leaders. Neverthe-
less, the Russian state identity can and should be
considered as one of the conditions of the society consoli-
dation and of an individual self-development in some
socially relevant forms of activity. And if the state as the
most important social institution does not want to lose the
ﬁght against the “invisible”, its “invented traditions” must
take into account the state identity which is being formed
by “Russia as a community of citizens” under the inﬂuence
of virtualization, information technologies, global values,
norms and outlooks.
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